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Nearly four years agone, the Electronic Privacy Information Center released FBI documents discussing a controversial surveillance technique. Both federal and local authorities frequently accept access to jail cell phone surveillance hardware, dubbed Stingrays (Harris Corp. refers to them every bit StingRays), that tin can be used to intercept and spy on communications from smartphones and other devices equipped with 3G or LTE modems.

Over the last iv years, court cases and document leaks have slowly pried back the cloak of secrecy that the FBI and the Harris Corporation, which manufactures many of the devices in question, have fought to continue in place. We now know that these devices are ofttimes used in cases that take nothing to do with terrorism or national security, and that they have been collectively deployed thousands of times across the country without a warrant. We know that in i example, the FBI asked local police to lie rather than admit to using Stingrays. Now, cheers to a enshroud of documents released past The Intercept, we have another vital piece of the puzzle: The operating manuals for several pieces of Stingray equipment.

StingRay1

The Stingray.

These documents describe the function of a number of Harris products. While we tend to refer to these devices equally "Stingrays," Harris has its ain codenames for specific products: KingFish, RayFish, Gemini, Arrowhead, and then on. Many of these components are modular and designed to work together. What we refer to as a "Stingray" is, I think, improve understood as a technology platform rather than a single device. This is an of import distinction, and it explains why dissimilar Stingray stories and investigations have ascribed a variety of capabilities to the devices. A Stingray isn't but one thing — its abilities vary depending on how you configure it and what you lot employ information technology for.

CDMA-Registration

The various manuals describe how a Stingray can be configured to sweep an expanse for individuals (information technology euphemistically refers to them as "subscribers,") then runway those signals over time. Stingrays tin can be outfitted with directional antennas to locate specific persons, and can as well interface with mapping software to plot the location of a specific device.

Registration

These products can be configured in several modes. In Zone Registration, Gemini (one component of the Stingray platform) will register all mobiles with the transceiver. As the guide states, this may result in missing subscribers if there are more people nearby than the device can handle. Alternately, the device tin page the MSID (Mobile Station ID). This is a number associated with both a specific phone and the telephone's service provider. This isn't the same thing as a phone number, just each device has a unique MSID. As the section to a higher place notes, this is the desired method for tracking a item device in a heavily populated expanse.

Stingrays aren't limited to any detail network. One of the documents leaked is an extensive overview of a product designed to spy on iDEN networks. iDEN is essentially defunct in the United States — the once-ubiquitous Nextel handsets (which chirped when yous pushed the push to talk) ran on iDEN, and at that place are a handful of products that still rely on it, merely now the US mainly relies on CDMA, GSM, and LTE, all of which are mentioned above.

One of the problems with monitoring LTE, yet, is that it's much more secure than older network standards like 2G. That'due south not a trouble for an accordingly tricked-out Stingray — it's easy to tell a connected device to driblet to a 2G signal.

Redirect-Mapping

We've combined two images from one of the manuals to illustrate how the redirect works. In the left-paw image, the Stingray operator configures the redirect for a detail "subscriber." Once this is done, the device tin be forced into 2G mode. The end-user may see a notification on their screen that they've been forced to a lower operating mode, merely they won't know why.

Using Gemini, law enforcement can configure the device to watch for specific subscribers, authenticate them automatically once they are in range, and notify the surveillance coiffure that a target has connected.

The mod surveillance state

Over the past decade, many individuals (and some corporations) have fought dorsum against the relentless extension of the surveillance state. In most cases, they've lost. The handful of courtroom cases that pushed back against mass surveillance accept been largely overturned, and companies like Harris continue to insist that their equipment is existence used to fight terrorism and only in accordance with local law.

Reality has told a very different story. Multiple law departments in multiple districts have been forced to admit that they've lied to judges about where information came from, misrepresented the nature of the Stingray when applying for warrants, or flatly ignored the legal requirement to get a warrant in the first identify. The fact that the FBI collaborated with the Harris Corporation and brash prosecutors to driblet cases rather than admit to using Stingrays is extremely troubling in its own correct, equally are the non-disclosure agreements the police take signed. In ane case, the FBI seized documents that a judge had ordered released, claiming they belonged to the U.s.a. Marshals service.

Much of this has been justified by arguing that the mere human action of owning a mobile phone is permission to publicly search that device's information. But this argument seems in conflict with how Stingrays practically work. While the particulars vary, we know that Stingrays are capable of intercepting voice and phone call data, too every bit intercepting all of the phone numbers that an individual calls or receives a call from. A person who purchases a cell phone may exist aware that their data will exist transmitted to AT&T — merely does a person who buys a cell telephone automatically consent to have their signal hijacked by a tertiary party? Does the act of buying a jail cell phone mean consenting to exist forced to an older, slower wireless standard for the express purpose of being spied upon?

Stingrays have been justified every bit anti-terror tools, but at that place's non 1 single case of a Stingray being used to cease a terror attack. That hasn't stopped police force departments across the country from deploying them in thousands of cases. The Harris Corporation and the FBI have gone to extreme lengths to hide the use of this technology precisely because it raises ramble questions they'd rather not see contested. A few states take already introduced laws requiring police to go a warrant before using Stingrays or like devices — hopefully these latest leaks volition spur other states to accept similar deportment.

We strongly recommend reading the Intercept commodity in a higher place and checking out the ExtremeTech and other stories we've linked to for more than data on this topic.